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T

he Tempest is often regarded, and rightly so, as Shakespeare’s last
great play. Many scholars argue that Prospero is an analogue for
Shakespeare himself, noting the similarities between Prospero’s illusory
magic and Shakespeare’s poetic genius. The themes of imagination,
illusion, and, indeed, theatre itself play an integral role. The line that is perhaps
most often cited as evidence for this argument is Prospero’s speech directly after he
breaks up the wedding masque in which he refers to “the great globe itself ” (IV.
i.153).1 There is a danger, however, in appealing to the author’s biography or
treating the biography as paramount, namely that the art work loses its autonomy.
Barbara Tovey, while not adopting this interpretation per se, posits a species of this
argument. She reads The Tempest as Shakespeare’s direct response to, and defense
of, Plato’s conception of imitative poetry found in The Republic. Biographical
criticism, however valuable it may be, will not be our main concern; rather, we
will shift the focus from Shakespeare’s biography to the text of The Republic.
Tovey’s essay, “Shakespeare’s Apology for Imitative Poetry: The Tempest and
The Republic,” is an exercise in both historical and political criticism that takes
into account the ideal city of which Socrates speaks in The Republic.2 A more
psychological approach using Plato’s Republic, however, can yield an equally
valuable discussion. If we remind ourselves that the main concern of The
Republic is not to provide a blueprint of the perfect city but rather to provide
an account of the nature of justice, we can easily see that the tripartite ideal
city is a metaphor or analogy for the human psyche. There are many parallels
between The Republic and The Tempest and, indeed, Platonic philosophy
in general. G. Wilson Knight, for example, in his essay “Prospero’s Lonely
Magic,” mentions “Plato’s two steeds of the soul” (Knight 137). This is, of
course, a reference to The Phaedrus, another Platonic dialogue. Knight does
not develop the idea fully, but if he had, it isn’t obvious where that line of
inquiry would have taken us. Knight makes an interesting observation, but
a more proﬁtable means of inquiry is to be found in The Republic. In order
to accomplish this we need to take a look at what Plato considered virtues,
which, if properly cultivated, help bring about justice. The Platonic idea of
justice and virtue as a lens through which to examine Prospero reveals to us
a better understanding of the development of his character throughout the
course of the play. We should though offer a brief explication of Platonic
justice before addressing The Tempest.
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The Republic is concerned with the nature of justice in the
individual, how Plato arrives at this point, though, is through
a lengthy discussion of justice in the ideal city. Socrates states,
“let’s ﬁrst ﬁnd out what sort of thing justice is in a city and
afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in
which the smaller is similar to the larger” (369).3 This is not
to say that The Republic doesn’t contain any political insight;
surely it does. Books VIII and IX deal with the way in which
the various kinds of governments become increasingly less just
i.e. the timocracy becoming the oligarchy and so forth. Again,
Plato uses the constitutions of these various governments to talk
about the similar process that occurs in the human psyche.
Plato’s conception of the ideal city is tripartite; there is a ruling
class (guardians), a solider class (auxiliaries), and a working
class (craftsman). Likewise, the human psyche has three parts:
the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. The city and
the psyche are analogous in that each section of the city has
a particular function similar to the corresponding section of
the psyche: the guardians, auxiliaries, and workers correspond
to the rational, spirited, and appetitive, respectively. We will
return to this shortly. After laying out the class structure of the
city, Socrates’ interlocutors urge him to continue his discussion
of justice. Socrates remarks that “[he thinks the] city, if indeed
it has been correctly founded, is completely good” (427e). He
goes on to say that if the city is completely good then it will be
“wise, courageous, moderate, and just” (427e). Socrates and
company begin to examine the city with the hope of discovering
justice through a process of elimination; ﬁnding the other
virtues ﬁrst will ensure that whatever is left over will be justice.
Let’s consider the city and the psyche simultaneously.
Socrates and his interlocutors discover wisdom ﬁrst. Only
the guardians possess wisdom which is deﬁned as both good
judgment and a special knowledge of ruling; knowing what
is best for each part of the city. Guardians are also necessarily
wiser than the members of the other classes because they are
philosophers. Wisdom in the human psyche is located in “that
small part of himself that rules in him and makes … declarations
and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous for
each part and for the whole soul” (442c). The rational is most
suited to ruling the psyche because it is the seat of wisdom,
calculation, and learning.
The city is considered courageous “because of a part of itself
[auxiliaries] that has the power to preserve through everything
its belief about what things are to be feared” (429c). The
upbringing of the soldiers allows them to unwaveringly
internalize the laws of the city like well prepared wool that
once dyed holds its color (429e). Likewise, courage is located
in the spirited portion (the same portion that wills, desires,
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and emotes) of the psyche and we say one is courageous “when
[the spirited part] preserves through pains and pleasures the
declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t”
(442c). Courage is a kind of steadfastness or resoluteness which
the spirited part exhibits when it obeys the rational part.
Moderation isn’t localized in one class but rather it is shared
among them. The city contains a diversity of natures: the
guardians are, of course, the best natured while the majority of
the remaining citizens have a poorer nature (431c). Nevertheless
the “unanimity” or “agreement between the naturally worse
and naturally better as to which of the two is to rule both in
the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation” (432a-b).
Moderation is akin to self-control. One may have self-control
when the “naturally better part is in control of the worse”
(431b). Likewise, when the larger worse part overpowers the
smaller better part (of a person or city) “this is called being selfdefeated or licentious” (431b). In the psyche, each part agrees
that reason and the rational part should rule and do not seek to
“engage in civil war against it” (442d).
The last remaining virtue is justice, what is “left over” in
Socrates’ discussion of the city’s virtues. Socrates states that
“justice is doing one’s own work and not meddling with what
isn’t one’s own” (443b). A more psychic description of the just
person is one who does “not allow any part of himself to do the
work of another part or allow the various classes within him
to meddle with each other” (443d). When reason is allowed
to rule and the appetites and emotions are not trying to rule
in its stead, only then can a person’s actions be said to be just.
The preservation of this “inner harmony” is justice and those
actions that disrupt the inner harmony are unjust (443e). The
Tempest offers us a vivid representation of many of Plato’s
remarks concerning the psyche and virtue.
We can point out the similarities and parallels between The
Tempest and The Republic without making claims regarding
Shakespeare’s intentions. The Tempest, nevertheless, embodies
or concretizes the parts of the Platonic psyche in its characters.
Prospero, Ariel, and Caliban all exhibit more of one particular
psychic portion: Prospero represents the rational, Ariel the
spirited, and Caliban the appetitive. Tovey rightly observes
that “Caliban is a creature of bodily appetites and impulses”
and, indeed, “much of his talk throughout the play turns
on food” (291). Each of these characters, though, is not a
manifestation of just any spirited or appetitive psyche ,but
rather, each character is a manifestation of Prospero’s psyche;
as Knight puts it, Ariel and Caliban “are yoked in the employ
of Prospero” (137). While there is a deﬁnite master-slave
relationship between Prospero and the other characters there is
a great deal of Prospero’s language that is dedicated to ownership
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or possessiveness that suggests inclusion. It is not just any Ariel,
it is “my Ariel” (I.ii.188) or “my delicate Ariel” (IV.i.49) or “my
spirit” (V.i.6). Prospero speaks of Caliban, too, in the possessive
but in a much more disparaging tone: “Caliban, my slave, who
never / yields us kind answer” (I.ii.308-9). Let’s examine these
characters but with Prospero and the Platonic virtues in mind.
We shall ﬁnd that Prospero cannot be virtuous in the Platonic
sense until the play’s last act.
Prospero embodies the rational part of the Platonic psyche. We
can see his inclination toward wisdom and knowledge in his
recounting to Miranda of how it is that they came to the island.
Prospero, “being transported / And rapt in secret studies”
(I.ii.76-77), casts “the government … upon [his] brother”
Antonio (I.ii.75). This in turn “[awakes] an evil nature” in his
brother that ultimately leads him to usurp Prospero’s dukedom,
although Prospero is rightfully and technically still duke of
Milan. His enthusiasm for the “liberal arts” (I.ii.73) leads him
to “[neglect] worldly ends” (I.ii.89) and seek privacy for “the
bettering of [his] mind” (I.ii.90). Even the dim-witted Caliban
knows that if one wants to overthrow Prospero one can “brain
him” (III.ii.88) but only after “having ﬁrst seized his books”
(III.ii.89). Clearly, if there is any character that embodies the
rational portion of the psyche, it is Prospero.
Ariel represents the spirited portion of Prospero’s psyche.
Ariel’s function on the island, at least to Prospero, is one of
subservience. Plato also has this same role in mind when he
writes about the spirited portion’s function. Socrates asks
Glaucon: “isn’t it appropriate for the rational part to rule, since
it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole
soul, and for the spirited part to obey it and be its ally?” (441e).
The answer, of course, is yes. And indeed Ariel fulﬁlls a similar
function for Prospero. After all it is Ariel who “[performs]
to point the tempest that [Prospero] bade [him]” (I.ii.194),
divides the shipwrecked passengers “in troops … ‘bout the
isle” (I.ii.220), and stores the King’s ship “safely in harbor”
(I.ii.226). Ariel’s service to Prospero continues into the
play’s last act. Prospero, when he demands Ariel’s continued
subservience in Act I, scene ii, even assigns Ariel the pejorative
“moody;” here it means stubbornness but it can also connote
emotionality, something for which the spirited portion of the
psyche is responsible (I.ii.244). The other things that fall under
Ariel’s domain are things normally associated with the spirited
portion: the songs he sings, the dancing spirits he summons,
and the banquet he materializes and promptly vanishes for
Antonio and company.
If we look at Ariel and Prospero in terms of Platonic virtue, thus
far we see that Prospero, the rational, is in control of Ariel, the
spirited, precisely as Plato suggests. It is a forced subservience
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but the “correct” arrangement; Ariel “obeys” and is a kind of
“ally” to Prospero. Prospero, by deﬁnition, is not moderate
since the arrangement is forced and not completely unanimous
and therefore cannot be just. Both Ariel and Caliban protest
Prospero’s rule on the island and until all three characters can
reach an agreement Prospero cannot be virtuous.
Caliban represents the appetitive portion and, like Ariel,
dislikes his position in the hierarchy of the island. Plato
conceives of the appetitive portion as the larger and baser
portion that includes things like food, drink, and sex. One
of the ﬁrst things we learn of Caliban is his attempted rape of
Miranda; Prospero used to allow him to stay in his “cell till [he]
… [sought] to violate / The honor of [his] child” (I.ii.347-8).
Plato also urged for a ﬁner control over the appetites and we
see Prospero continuously threatening Caliban with “cramps”
and “pinches” at various points throughout the play. Ariel
is quicker to obey than is Caliban. Prospero and Miranda
“cannot miss him”, though, because he does perform for them
certain chores (I.ii.311). Despite our baser needs we cannot
escape from them.
We have established Ariel’s unruliness, but Caliban’s is of a
higher magnitude. Caliban’s run in with Stephano and Trinculo
reveals to us just how much Caliban resents Prospero. Caliban
sees Prospero as “a tyrant, / A sorcerer, that by his cunning hath
/ Cheated [him] of the island” (III.ii.41-4). He proceeds to
urge Stephano to “revenge it on him” (III.ii.54). If we recall
that moderation involves each part of the psyche agreeing that
the smaller portion, the rational, should rule over the bigger
portions, the appetitive and the spirited, and that “they should
not engage in civil war against it” (442d), we see that, still, at
this point in the play, by deﬁnition, Prospero isn’t moderate,
not with his appetitive portion plotting to kill him.
Prospero’s desire for vengeance, to repay his usurping brother,
drives much of The Tempest’s action. His treatment of Antonio
and company via Ariel throughout the play’s middle acts
serves as a kind of vengeance so that by the time we reach
Act V Prospero’s character is transformed. Ariel remarks how
Prospero’s “charm so strongly works ‘em / That if [he] now
beheld them, [his] affections / would become tender” (V.i.179). Despite Prospero’s indignation, he realizes that he should
favor his “nobler reason ‘gainst [his] fury” (V.i.26) and that
“The rarer action is / In virtue than in vengeance” (V.i.27-8).
Shortly after Prospero explicitly states he will choose virtue
over vengeance, Caliban realizes that he mistakenly assumed
Stephano “for a god” (V.i.297) and he remarks on “how ﬁne
[his] master is” (V.i.262). Prospero, in turn, says of Caliban,
“this thing of darkness I / Acknowledge mine” (V.i.275-6).
A few lines later, Caliban, after Prospero instructs him to
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prepare his cell, assures Prospero that “[he’ll] be wise hereafter”
(V.i.295). The appetitive and the rational both agree that the
better part should rule. Prospero is ﬁnally moderate, but is he
just?
All the parts of the psyche must be in harmony for one to
be considered just. But in the ﬁnal act of the play, Ariel is
released from service and is no longer there to “obey” and be
Prospero’s “ally.” While it seems impossible to divorce oneself
from any portion of one’s psyche, we can nevertheless regard
Prospero’s choice to let Ariel go as a just act. An action is just
if it preserves the harmony among the portions of the psyche:
letting Ariel go is just insofar as the action eliminates the strife
we observed earlier in the play. There is agreement among
both the spirited and the appetitive that the rational should
rule and none is trying to do the job or perform the function
of the other. At the close of Act V, we can regard Prospero as
virtuous and just.
There is no doubt that Prospero undergoes a transformation;
he can be regarded as vengeful up until the latter acts of the
play. There are, of course, many ways to understand his
transformation but the play seems to provide us with characters
that ﬁt neatly with Plato’s conception of the human psyche
found in The Republic. Prospero, Ariel, and Caliban can be
understood as the concretized elements of Prospero’s psyche.
Prospero’s transformation, then, is found in his movement
towards Platonic virtue throughout the play. The tempest
within Prospero quiets as the observable elements of his psyche,
Ariel and Caliban, settle into harmony, each performing his
own function and not interfering with the other.
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To claim that Shakespeare had Plato’s work in mind when he
composed The Tempest, the position of Tovey and others, is
to argue for a claim that, most likely, will go unsubstantiated.
Arguments like these rely heavily, because they must, on primary
texts and their intertextuality. But the next step, claiming that
the author consciously incorporated elements of another text,
especially when both authors have been dead for centuries, does
little to bolster one’s argument. There is no doubt, however,
that Ancient Greek philosophy, especially Plato, has shaped
the western consciousness. It is entirely possible—indeed
likely—that Shakespeare was aware, if only through second
hand sources, of basic Platonic notions. Platonic thought,
speciﬁcally The Republic, is one of many underpinnings for
The Tempest. Shakespeare’s last great play moves us by virtue
of its literary achievement while, at the same time, it resonates
deeply with a broader tradition in thought and culture.
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